For a man described as “the greatest strategist you’ve never heard of”, there certainly is a lot written about John Boyd: Robert Corham’s biography, Frans Osinga’s book, plus a compilation of essays from noted Boyd enthusiasts.
Scarcely a critical word is ever spoken of Boyd and his theories, to say little of his acolytes and the Defense Reform Movement. That is, until a doctoral dissertation came my way, courtesy of Chris Manteuffel.
Boyd’s modern-day acolytes might recall the Loopy One’s frustration with expensive, heavy, twin-engine fighters, such as the F-4, F-111, F-14, and most notably, the F-15. According to Robert Corham’s account, Boyd was dismayed at the fact that increasingly expensive jet fighters put the US at a numerical disadvantage against the Soviets in Europe. Moreover, Boyd, with his energy-maneuverability theory, advocated vast numbers of small, lightweight fighters, capable of out-performing nimble Soviet jets in close-range dogfights. The lackluster performance of McDonnell-Douglas’ F-4 Phantom against North Vietnam’s antiquated MiG-19 and MiG-21 only bolstered Boyd’s argument.
Thus, the Lightweight Fighter Program was born, with Boyd describing the leading model, the YF-16, as a ”true fighter pilot’s aircraft”. The new lightweight fighter sported a bubble canopy–not unlike the classic P-51D Mustang–for excellent 360-degree visibility. And though the new fighter was devilishly maneuverable, it was notoriously unstable. This prompted Lockheed-Martin to develop a radical fly-by-wire system, in which on-board computers had authority over much of the aircraft’s control surfaces.
Lockheed's YF-16 prototype
Boyd and the “Fighter Mafia” felt that high-end avionics, such as radar, needlessly weighed down the aircraft, making it less agile in a dogfight. (These “gold-plated” add-ons also, incidentally, made the aircraft more expensive, which limited the aircraft’s production run) Drawing on experience gained from dogfights over North Vietnam, Boyd lobbied to remove the radar from the YF-16, which would later become the US Air Force’s F-16 Fighting Falcon.
In a poignant passage from Corham’s book, Boyd was crushed when the Air Force overrode him, installing the radar anyway. Boyd’s child had been defiled by what he viewed as corruption within the defense industry.
But we never really heard the other side of the story.
F-15C Eagle, courtesy of US Air Force on Flickr
Boyd’s acolytes often neglect to mention that the F-15, so derided by Boyd, would rack up an unprecedented 104 air-to-air kills against zero losses. Nor do they mention that the F-16 would become an even better fighter, thanks to more reliable air-to-air missiles (the AIM-7 Sparrow was notoriously ineffective during the Vietnam War). And Boyd was probably shocked to learn that one of the first combat operations featuring his beloved F-16 wasn’t a dogfight, but a bombing run, with F-15s providing top cover. And though Boyd would have balked at the F-22 Raptor’s $150 million price tag and paltry production run of 187, it’s still more numerous than any fighter aircraft cranked out by Russia’s faltering aerospace industry since the end of the Cold War.
If you have a weekend to spare, I’d recommend checking out this dissertation; it’s about a lot more than fighter aircraft. I should also thank Chris for pointing out a master’s thesis I’ve long been searching for, which asserts that fighter pilot subculture is not unlike the corporate culture at Enron.
A productive weekend for sure.
Addendum: All this criticism of risk aversion needs to be balanced with some of the vignettes from Enron. Nassim Taleb, in The Black Swan, notes that successful businessmen often attribute their success to aggressive risk taking in their autobiographies. Nevertheless, Taleb rightly points out that America’s unemployment lines are filled with aggressive risk-takers as well (Enron and AIG, anyone?).
But, of course, not many people write books about bad investments, do they?
For additional interesting insight, I’d recommend reading the original “Ault Report” by Navy CAPT Frank Ault that looked into Navy air-to-air performance in Vietnam:
http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ault/sections1-4.pdf
It is most famous for spurring development of the “Top Gun” school, but many of its recommendations applied to the whole system of developing, buying, maintaining, and training to missile systems. Its a facinating read. The report states up front that while it would have been more convenient to find 1-2 critical deficiencies in US performance and apply those fixes, in reality it was a “jungle” of issues all along the process of air-to-air missile capability (also the real statistic was only 1 in 10 missile firings resulted in a kill, not a 1 in 10 dogfight ratio).
Phil,
Thanks for link. Another good read is Scream of Eagles.
Update on my prevoius comments. This post didn’t get the reactions I would have guessed on initial read. But just to close the loop – Have finished reading the thesis and definitely see it as two sided. One- the history side seems informative and gives pause to think about our current F-22, F-35, aircraft for COIN, future force structure debates. Michel is certainly “all hail technology” and most certainly opposed to anyone who says different.
Note his thesis basically stops with “how wonderful all is post Desert Storm” and does not get into the post 9-11 world where questions of over reliance on technolgy are daily. He’s only a short jump from GO EBO!!!
As to Boyd issues, I was left with thinking either people like G.I. Wilson, Gen Van Riper, Don Vandergriff, Chet Richards, and a whole host of others have just been totally misled or flat out lying Or that something is wrong in Michel’s structuring and telling of the facts. Pursued this through a link stemming out of the River Rats with people who knew Michel and there thoughts were he would manipulate to tell his side.
Given that I know certain aspects are incorrect, I’ll stick with my view of Col Boyd.
If I might add in a few minor quibbles:
- The F-16 got it’s debut bombing due to the “corruption” (I.E. the multirole) in a role Boyd did not foresee for it.
- AFAIK the F-16 also has zero losses to enemy aircraft (though not as many kills due to it’s multirole vs the F-15Cs single role)
In a way the F-15 proves the concept on single role aircraft being best – they do not need to have compromises. (Though the F.15 has proven a good ground attack aircraft). But how many airforces can afford singel role aircraft anymore….
The fundamental problem with the original F-16 as envisioned by Boyd was that it woudl have been next to useless in the environment it was supposed to fight in. A day only fighter armed exclusively with a cannon and IR missiles would have been grounded most of the days needed to fight in Europe against the Red Air Force. Moreover, its air-to-air capabilites would nothave swayed the balance against superior numbers given that it only would have carried 2 missiles. So, the Air Force, by upgrading the radar and improving the multirole capability made it a significantly more useful platform for more mission parameters (day, night, adverse weather, ground attack, and air-to-air). All done without making it prohibitively expensive. The USAF did not need a fighter prepared to fight and win only over MiG Alley again. that is what John boyd essentially demanded. The technology that many of the defense Reformers derided as too expensive, gold plated, and unreliable has been anything but. The technology has become very cheap, plentiful, and reliable. the F-16 today is an example of those improvements.
fighter pilot subculture is not unlike the corporate culture at Enron.
Lol a Trash Hauler bashing the Fighter Jocks. While it’s a Masters Thesis, it’s still pretty High School. Please boys, stop quibbling over your shiny toys. At least the Chair Force guys get to sleep in warm beds.
While the argument for a “low-end” fighter produced in great numbers had obvious merit, Boyd’s argument for an IR missile/cannon armed dogfighter was indeed a bit too austere.
While Boyd was striving for a very minimalist fighter, the Soviets were on the verge of introducing the MiG-29 as a counter, armed with very long range radar missiles. The F-16 with no radar/ECM would have been easy meat.
This thesis is just odd. I got intrigued and read about half so far. When the author discusses history of air-air warfare and how fighter design evolved out of Vietnam – to include the emergence of TOPGUN and RED FLAG – it seems well researched and written. But then he throws in these comments about Boyd and the whole writing style changes – very snarky.
I have done significant research my self in the related subjects and was close to some of this from Navy side. Given that it’s focus is Air Force, found some things I hadn’t seen explained before. But he’s written 450+ pages with an apparent agenda to downplay – and not nicely – anything John Boyd did.
And he is just flat wrong and misleading in places. One example. He notes that Boyd briefed the TOPGUN group shortly after their beginning and got in a disagreement over the F-4 and MIG 17, Boyd claiiming an F-4 could never beat a 17. Supposedly the TOPGUN CO Mugs McKuen disagreed. This is disengenious. Mugs was up at VX-4 working Have Donut/Drill and then in VF-161 on Midway (readyroom next to mine) getting two MIG kills before coming back to be TOPGUN CO in mid-72. Did they meet, have an argument I’m guessing yes. Navy vs AF and Mugs was everything you think about attitude wise as a fighter pilot. For F-4 vs MIG-17 in energy maneuverability terms/technical analysis Boyd was right. No US fighter could turn with the 17. From pure pwerformance numbers Phantom was in clear disadvantage. The F-4 and F-8 had to go vertical. That was one reason the EM curves were so valuable- it showed where tactics had to be adjusted because of mismatch in pure performance.
Every “insert” related to Boyd seems intended to be negative and is unbalanced. So far it is a detractor and glancing at his closing that’s where he goes. Just odd.
OBTW as an example he links Boyd’s group – noting Chet Richard’s Defense and the National Interest as anti-military. Huh?
That John Boyd was sincere and highly intelligent is beyond dispute.
But I must point out he was wrong about the F-14 opposing all types of Soviet combat aircraft, including the MiG-25.
IRIAF Tomcats shot down roughly 130 IrAF combat aircraft during the Iran-Iraq War, while suffering from maintenance and spare parts issues. They lost only four F-14s, two in the very last week of the war to specially equipped IrAF Mirage fighters.
And let’s also remember that Boyd’s contribution to the Gulf War ’91 plan represented an unnecessary complication to the war plan, as it vastly over-estimated Iraqi military capabilities.